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Thispaperdescribes and tests the proposition that
the mixture of monetary and fiscal policies signifi-
cantly affects exchange rates. We begin with the
historical background describing the major shift in
policy mix since the 1973 oil crisis. We then testtwo
models of exchange-rate determination for' four
currencies vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar. Finally, we
consider the policy implications ofthe shift in U.S.
policy mix-expanding government debt and con-
tracting money growth-for the behavior of the
dollar-exchange r~te, the conclusion.
Many analysts argued during the early 1970s that
individual countries would gain greater indepen-
dent control over their domestic stabilization poli-
cies if they adopted a system of floating exchange
rates. Two problems related to fixed exchange rates
commandeda good deal ofattentionbefore general-
ized floating actually began in 1973.
First, rapid economic expansion in an open econ-
omy often tended to increase imports and decrease
exports, leading to deficits in the balance of pay-
ments. A current-account imbalance which was not
offset by capital flows had to be met out ofofficial
foreign-exchange reserves. When pressure on these
reserves increased, a country had to choose be-
tween a politically unpopular devaluation or politi-
cally unpopular deflationary measures.
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Second, the United States, as the principal re-
serve currency country, could "export" its infla-
tion under fixed exchange rates. Attempting to
maintain fixed exchange rates required that any
excess supply of U.S. dollars, putting downward
pressure on the dollar, had to be absorbed in the
foreign exchange market by countries within the
fixed rate system. Purchasing these dollars at afixed
rate tended to expand foreign money supplies and,
over time, to lead to additional inflation. Attempts
to offset this expansion in foreign money supplies
by individual "sterilization" operations usually
proved to be only moderately effective.
Floating exchange rates promised to do away
with these problems. Instead of reducing a coun-
try's international reserves, an incipient balance-
of-payments deficit would trigger an appropriate
exchange rate depreciation. Such a depreciation, it
was hoped, would no longer be unpopular because
it would represent an automatic market response-
a smooth adjustment, rather than a decision
by politicians to devalue by a discrete amount.
Furthermore, U.S. inflation could no longer be
exported because U.S. monetary expansion would
depreciate the dollar, alleviating the incipient price
pressure in othercountries. Floating exchange rates
thus would permit independent domestic stabiliza-
tion policies, because any domestic move which
would have encountered international constraints
under the fixed exchange-rate regime would now
only produce automatic and-it was thought-less
painful adjustments in exchange rates.'
Since the advent offloating, the industrial coun-
tries have indeed followed independent domestic
economic policies, in the sense that policies have
differed radically both between countries and be-
tween the pre- and post-floating periods in any giv-
en country. The quadrupling of oil prices in late
1973 severely strained the industrialized countries,
forcing most into recession in 1974 and 1975. Sev-eral countries ran large budgetdeficits in the hopeof
stimulating economic growth and getting out ofthe
recession. The distinguishing feature between
countries, however, was their choice of means to
finance these deficits.
An expansionary budget deficit must be fi-
nanced. Ifthe central bank buys government bonds
by increasing the reserve base of the banking sys-
tern, the debt is monetized resulting in monetary
expansion. If the debt is sold directly to the pub-
lic, however, the policy may be characterized as
fiscal expansion. In either case, the debt is ulti-
mately held by the public either as money or as
government debt.
Wary of kindling rapid inflation, some coun-
tries-notably Japan-shifted their policy stance
in the 1974-75 recession away from monetary
expansion towards fiscal expansion. Others main-
tained the previous balance between monetary
and fiscal policy, while some shifted toward mone-
tary expansion.
The United States showed a fairly consistent rate
of monetary expansion between the 1968-73 and
1973-79 periods-slightly lower after floating be-
gan than before (Table I). Germany, the United
Kingdom and (especially) Japan showed lower
monetary growth between the two periods, while
Canada and Italy showed increasing rates ofgrowth.
The disparities in fiscal expansion were even
greater (Table 2). Every country in our sample
displayed a major increase in total government debt
between 1968-73 and 1973-79. In the latter period,
government debt increased between 94percent (the
U.S.) and 667 percent (Japan), with the increases
elsewhere spread between 100 and 300 percent.
The expansion of government debt was particu-
larly noticeable in Japan. Following the 1973 oil
crisis, Japan's sectoral saving behavior changed
dramatically. According to flow-of-funds statistics,
the public-sector deficit as a percent of nominal
GNP rose from 2 percent to 9 percent between 1973
and 1978, while the corporate-sector deficit dropped
from about 6 percent of nominal GNP in 1973 to
almost zero in 1978. According to the Bank of
Japan, following the oil crisis, Japan and other
countries "resorted to fiscal me~ures in an attempt
to stimulate business activity, which caused the
substantial increase in the financial deficit of the
public sector. Subsequently, the financial deficit of
the public sector in leading Western countries has
tended to decrease, while in Japan it has acceler-
ated, necessitating massive issues of public bonds,
mostly government bonds, which caused the inevi-
table increase ofthe stock ofpublic bonds."2
Table 1 Table 2
Annual Average Growth of Percentage Increase in
M-2 MoneySupply Total Government Debt
(Percent) (Percent)
1968-73 1973-79 1968-73 1973-79
Canada 12.3 17.0 Canada 29.1 139.2
Germany I I.I 8.6 Germany 30.0 230.2
Franee 14.2 14.4 France -14.1 186.9
Italy 16.9 209 Italy 127.1 301.7
Japan 20.2 12.0 Japan 102.1 666.8
U.K 15.8 11.4 U.K* 10.6 134.2
U.S 9.2 8.5 U.S. 21.4 93.9
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, [MF, November
1981 Data Tape, Lines 34 and 35.
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SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, [MF, November
1981 DataTape, Lines 88 and 88b. *U.K. figures are for national
debt in sterling;csa Financial Statistics, February 1979 and
February 1981.I. Monetary-Fiscal Mix
One way ofcapturing the monetary-fiscal policy
mix is to compare the ratio (sigma) ofgovernment
bonds held by the public to the central bank's re-
serve money stock. An increase in sigma implies a
financing ofnew government debt by an increase in
the direct holdings ofthe public; it represents great-
erreliance on fiscal policy than on monetary policy.
As a rough indicator of fiscal-monetary policy
mix, the sigma ratios revealed a major shift in
policy emphasis among major industrial countries
after 1974 (Figure I). Canada, Germany, Italy and
the U.S. all had sigma ratios roughly between .6
and .8 during the 1973-74 period, with Japan's sig-
ma ratio considerably lower. But a dramatic shift
occurred after 1974. Germany and Japan displayed
a rapid increase between 1975 and 1978, with Japan
moving from the lowest ratio of the five countries
to the second highest. The sigma ratio rose slight-
ly for the U.S. in 1975-76 but declined there-
after. Canada's sigma ratio fell in 1974 but then
remained rather stable, while Italy's sigma rose
rapidly after 1976.
Obviously, then, industrialized countries have
employed widely different mixtures of monetary
and fiscal policies in the past decade. The promise
of floating exchange rates has been in that sense
fulfilled. Butsince exchange rates are now designed
to reconcile policies which would have been incon-
sistent under the earlier regime, there arises a ques-
tion ofjust how different mixtures ofmonetary and
fiscal policy interact to affect exchange rates.
This question takes on heightened significance
for the United States, for obvious reasons. This
country has now adopted essentially a policy fol-
lowed by Japan after the first oil price shock: one of
curtailing monetary growth while incurring an ex-
pansion in government debt. In early 1982, the
Federal Reserve was continuing its anti-inflationary
policyby attempting to reduce the growth rate ofthe
narrowly-defined money stock, M-I, while fiscal
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1976 1977 1978policy promised to produce record deficits over the
1982-84 fiscal years. The result ofsuch a change in
monetary-fiscal policy mix is the focus ofthis paper.
Early theories of the determination of exchange
rates emphasized their role as equilibrators oftrade
flows between countries. Recent theories, however,
have insisted on a wider role: the exchange rate in
the short-run must equilibrate the demand and sup-
ply offinancial assets denominated in different cur-
rencies. Equilibrium between supply and demand,
according to recent theories, occurs much more
quickly in financial-asset markets than in goods-
and-services markets. The exchange rate thus may
be viewed as the equilibrium relative price offinan-
cial assets in the short run but only as the equilibri-
um relative price ofgoods in the long run.
In this article, we will consider two asset-market
approaches to the determination ofexchange rates.
The first and simplest approach is a monetary
model. It maintains that, given the nature of inter-
national capital markets, only relative monetary
policies are relevant to determining exchange rates.
Thus we specify and estimate a monetary model
for the rates ofCanada, Germany, Italy and Japan
against the U.S. dollar. This simple model does not
provide an adequate explanation of exchange-rate
movements, however. Thus we estimate a more
general model, a portfolio-balance model, which
maintains that both monetary and fiscal policy are
relevant to the determination of exchange rates.
Empirical results for the four currencies vis-a-vis
the U.S. dollarhelp supportthis model, by showing
that the exchange rate is affected both by the stock
ofmoney and the amount ofgovernment debt. The
mix ofmonetary and fiscal policy thus is important
to exchange-rate determination in the short run.
II. Monetary Model
The most popular theory ofexchange-rate deter-
mination in the post-floating period has been the
monetary approach.' The exchange rate, as the val-
ue of one country's currency expressed in units of
another's currency, thus may be viewed as a mea-
sure ofthe relative price ofgoods between the two
countries, for the value of a country's currency is
just the inverse ofits price level.
This monetary approach is distinguished by three
key assumptions. First, there is continuous equi-
librium in money and goods markets. Second-a
related point-there is also purchasing power par-
ity, since a unitofone's home currency always buys
as much at home as that same unit buys abroad when
converted into foreign currency.4 Third, there is
perfect substitutability among all bonds, foreign
and domestic-''there is only one bond in the
world." Thus the only way in which foreign and
domestic asset markets are distinguished is by their
different currencies. Furthermore, different mix-
tures ofmonetary and fiscal policy do not affect the
exchange rate, because by this assumption bonds
issued by any government simply increase the
world bond stock. U.S. dollar denominated bonds
are perfect substitutes for yen denominatedbonds in
private portfolios.
As a necessary consequence of these assump-
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tions, there is interest-rate parity-or, equivalently,
perfect capital mobility. Abstracting from expecta-
tions ofappreciation or depreciation, any deviation
of a country's interest rate from the rest of the
world's is reversed by a capital inflow oroutflow.
Given these assumptions, the monetary approach
suggests that monetary equilibrium exists in each
country at the intersection of the aggregate supply
and demand curves for money. Because continuous
equilibrium is assumed, one need in theory only
attend to the demand curve (or equally to the supply
curve), for the country is always on both of the
curves.sThe monetary approach is fundamentally a
hypothesis of the stability of demand for money
functions across countries.
Money demand is usually thought to be a func-
tion, among other things, of the price level, real
income and interest rates. Equilibrium, then, guar-
antees a unique price level in each countryfor given
amounts ofthose variables, and with all other influ-
ences on money demand held constant. Purchasing-
power parity requires-again as an equilibrium
condition, not as a theory of causation-that the
exchange rate between any two countries be at a
level which preserves the value of one currency
measured in goods when it is converted into the
other.e = C + (m - m*) a(y - y*) + f3(i i*) (5)
Fonnally, let the money-demand function ofthe
home country be written:
Substituting equation (3) into equation (4) and re-
arranging gives
(6) i - i* =e e
whereeis the forward exchange rate overthe period
equal to the time ofmaturity ofthe bonds to which i
and i* correspond. Substituting equation (6) into
equation (5) and rearranging:
third, the coefficient on relative interest rates is
positive. An increase in e is a depreciation of the
home currency. Thus, other things constant, an
increase in the domestic money supply should pro-
duce an equiproportional depreciation of the ex-
change rate; an increase in domestic real income
should produce an appreciation; while an increase
in the domestic rate of interest should produce
a depreciation.
This last result may seem illogical: commonly it
is thought that a country supports its exchange rate
by forcing interest rates up. In this model the oppo-
site result holds because, given real income and
money, and given the assumption ofmoney-market
equilibrium, an increase in interest rates reduces
the demand for money, producing incipient excess
supply. By equation (4) prices of goods must rise
in order to equate money demand to the existing
supply, or else the equilibrium assumption will be
violated. This price rise produces a depreciation
because ofpurchasing-powerparity.
We can make the model dynamic by assuming
further that purchasing-power parity holds only in
the long run because prices adjust only slowly.
Some such assumption must be made in practice
to explain extended departures from purchasing-
powerparity.
The monetary approach is deceptively simple.
Without any further assumptions, the simple model
ofequation (5) can be extended to include expecta-
tions ofexchange-rate movements. The interest-rate
parity assumption is equivalent to an assumption
ofcompletely effective arbitrage-that is, any sus-
tained difference in interest rates must be reflected
in the difference between spot and expected future




(2) m* = c* + p* + a*y* - f3*i*
m = c + p + ay f3i
Purchasing-power parity requires that:
e = p - p*
where m is money; p is prices; y is real income; and
c is a constant, all written in natural logarithms: i is
the rateofinterest, and a and f3 are parameters. This
relationship is assumed to hold contemporaneously
for all variables.
Similarly, let the money-demand function for the
foreign country be written:
(m - m*) = (c c*) + (p - p*) + a(y - y*)
f3(i - i*) (4)
where C = c* c.
The assumption of identical coefficients in both
money-demand functions greatly simplifies the de-
velopmentofthe model. This is arbitrary, however,
and a slightly more complicated version could be
developed without imposing such a restriction.
Equation (5) is the fundamental equilibrium
condition of the simple monetary model of ex-
change-rate detennination. It suggests three test-
able hypotheses: first, the estimated coefficient
(elasticity) with respect to changes in relative
money supplies is positive and unity; second, the
coefficient on relative real income is negative; and,
where e is the logarithmofthe exchangerate in units
ofhome currency perunit offoreign currency.
Making the further assumptions that a = a* and
f3 = f3*-that is, that the money-demand functions
are identical between countries-and subtracting
equation (2) from equation (I), yields:
23Equation (7) suggests that an expectation of an
appreciation reflected in a fall in the forward rate
would be reflected in a spot depreciation as well.
The spot rate, then, is not independent of the for-
ward rate. However, ifwe assume the forward rate
is the expectation of the future spot rate, condi-
tioned on past and current values of the spot rate,
then the forward rate is itself not independent of
the spot rate.
6 Random errors in determining the
current spot rate-the ut in equation (7)-will be
correlated with the forward rate. This violates the
assumption that the error terms be uncorrelated with
the independent variables, which is necessary if
ordinary least-squares estimates are to be unbiased
and consistent.
In the estimations which follow, we make no
assumptions about expectations of exchange-rate
changes; indeed we estimate the simple model of
equation (5). Nevertheless, because ofthe interest-
rate parity condition in equation (6), errors in
determining et are transmitted to the interest-rate
differential, (it - it*). This again introduces a cor-
relation between an independent variable and the
error term, rendering ordinary least-squares esti-
mates biased and inconsistent.
In order to secure consistent estimates of equa-
tions (5), we resort to an instrumental-variables
technique in which the instrument for (i i*) is
((T - (T*), where (T = In(B/RM), the ratio of
government bonds in private hands to central-bank
reserve money (monetary base). This should be
closelycorrelated with (i - i*) because (Trepresents
the mixture of government stabilization policies-
i.e., the balance between outside bonds and outside
money. A rise in (T must result either from a rise in
bonds or a fall in reserve money, either of which
tends to raise interest rates. Similarly, a fall in (T
would be associated with a fall in rates. This bond-
money ratio, being under government control,
therefore is exogenous and uncorrelated with the
error term in equation (5).1
The results of the exchange-rate estimations
(Table 3 and Chart I) vary somewhat from country
to country, but they give little support on the whole
for the simple monetary approach. In three of the
four cases, the coefficient on the money differential
is positive as predicted. ForJapan it is negative but
statistically insignificant, while in Germany it is
correctly positive though insignificant nonetheless.
In the remaining two cases, the coefficients are of
Table 3
Monetary Model for Currencies of
Canada, Germany, Italy and Japan Against the U.S. Dollar
(Monthly, March 1973- December 1978)
Independent Variables Summary Statistics
Dependent
Variable Constant 1n(mus/m) 1n(Yus/y) (ius-i) fj2 OW RHO SER
In
(U.S. $ - 1.27 .54** .03a
.948 1.78 .73 .013
(Canadian $) (9.5) (9.2) (0.6) (5.8)
In
(U.S. $ ) - .99 1.51 c .07
w .033**
(9.8) (1.4) (.28) (2.8) .888 1.94 .86 .034
(Gennan DM)
In
(U.S. $ -3.06 .67** .02
w .02**
.971 1.96 .79 .027
(Italian Lira) (6.5) (7.3) (.19) (4.8)
In
(U.S. $ - 8.50 _.52w _.30e _.04a
.958 2.12 .83 .028
(Japanese Yen) (3.6) (1.19) (1.04) (5.5)
t-statistics in parentheses under the coefficients.
All estimates use the FAIR technique with In(O' 0'*) as an instrument (see footnote 7).
** Significantly different from zero at the 99-percent confidence level and ofthe predicted sign.
c Insignificant, but ofthe predicted sign.
w Insignificant and not ofthe predicted sign.
a Significant at the 99-percent confidence level, but not ofthe predicted sign.
See data appendix for a description ofthe data.
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25the correct sign and significantly different from
zero. Contrary to the prediction ofthe simple mone-
tary approach of equation (5), however, they are
also significantly different from unity.
The coefficient on the income differential is of
the wrong sign in every case but Japan, and it is
insignificant in every case. In contrast, the coeffi-
cienton the interest-rate differential is significant in
every case, of the correct sign for Germany and
Italy and ofthe incorrectsign for CanadaandJapan.
In all, the U.S. dollar/Italian lira rate offers the
best support for the monetary approach: it carries a
significant coefficient with the correct sign on both
the money and interest-rate differentials, while its
incorrectly signed coefficient on the real-income
differential is insignificant. Still, the coefficient on
the money differential is significantly different
from unity, violating a crucial prediction of the
simple monetary model. The U.S. dollar/Japanese
yen rate is the least supportive of the monetary
approach: every coefficient carries the incorrect
sign or is insignificant. The remaining pair of ex-
change rates show mixed results. The results were
littled improved with the removal ofthe assumption
of identical money-demand coefficients, or with a
greater role given to real interest-rate differentials
in the short-run determinationofthe exchange rate.
The mixed results for the monetary approach
may reflect the instability in U.S. money demand
observed over the 1974-75 period. Instability in
money-demand coefficients would create difficul-
ties even for a more sophisticated form ofthe mon-
etary approach, such as one distinguishing between
real and nominal interest rates or one permitting
short-rundeviations from purchasing-powerparity.
III. Portfolio-Balance Model
Some of the empirical failings of the simple
monetary model of exchange-rate determination
can be explained if we relax some of the model's
assumptions. The beauty ofthe monetary model is
its simplicity; but what it loses in simplicity when
these assumptions are relaxed, it gains in greater
realism. Abandoning the assumption of perfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign
bonds implicitly introduces portfolio-balance con-
siderations into the monetary model. Inthis section,
we set out a fuller model of international portfolio
balance and estimate it.
With this approach, we widen the scope of the
model to include the demand functions for money,
domestic bonds and foreign bonds, each dependent
on the domestic and the foreign rate ofinterest for a
given expected future exchange rate. In the short
run, the supplies of all three assets are fixed. Do-
mestic bonds and money are determined by the
monetary and fiscal authorities. Domestic holdings
of foreign bonds represent cumulated current-
account surpluses and deficits. Total wealth de-
nominated in domestic currency equals the sum of
these asset stocks, with the foreign bond stock
converted at the current exchange rate. The interest
rates and the exchange rate must simultaneously
adjust in orderto bring the demands for these stocks
into accord with the fixed supplies.
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As with the monetary approach, the portfolio-
balance approach models private sector behavior.
Unlike that model, however, it refers to outside
rather than inside assets, that is, liabilities created
by the public sectorrather than the private sector. In
the monetary model, the asset markets of the two
countries are linked by the direct effectofmoney on
the goods market: money as purchasing power de-
termines the price of goods, and the exchange rate
insures parity between the currencies given these
prices. For such a mechanism, money is whatever
can be used to buy goods-currency, ofcourse, but
also demand deposits and other sufficiently liquid
assets (i.e., inside money).
In contrast, in the portfolio-balance approach the
goods market is pushed into the background. The
exchange rate adjusts the domestic currency value
offoreign financial assets in private portfolios to the
level consideredoptimal by portfolio holders, given
interestrates and asset stocks. Money and bonds are
treated as forms ofwealth. Since inside assets (e.g.,
demand deposits or corporate bonds held domesti-
cally) are at once the asset of some private entity
and the debt of some other private entity, they
cancel out when all private-sector assets and lia-
bilities are added up. Only the liabilities of the
government-currency, central-bank reserves, and
treasury debt-and of the foreign sector are netfinancial wealth to the private sector. A change in
interest rates may force an individual to alter his
holdings of inside as well as outside assets, yet
taken as a whole the private sector is in equilibrium
once itwillinglyholds all the outsideassets supplied
to it by the government.
The portfolio-balance approach directly models
financial markets. The price level of the home or
foreign country plays no direct part in the shortrun,
yet the goods market still influences financial equi-
librium in this approach. From the home country's
view, higher prices abroad encourage domestic
exports and discourage imports. A resulting cur-
rent-account imbalance must becounterbalancedby
capital flows into the home country. These capital
flows are simply newly-acquired foreign assets,
which increase domestic wealth and require inter-
est-rate and exchange-rate changes to rebalance
domestic portfolios.
From this general discussion, we next tum to
a simple portfolio-balance model suggested by
Branson, Halttunen and Masson.
8 This model
shares with the monetary model the fundamental
assumption ofcontinuous financial market equilib-
rium, which simply means that it is a static and not a
dynamic model. Its equations specify the shares of
wealth willingly held by the private sector in var-
ious assets for given interest rates. These equations
do not specify the adjustment process followed by
interest rates or exchange rates as they move from
one equilibrium to another with a change in any of
the asset stocks.
The fundamental distinction between the two
models concerns the substitutability between do-
mestic and foreign bonds; domestic and foreign
bonds are perfect substitutes in the monetary model
but are not in the portfolio model. Purchasing-
power parity need not hold even when prices have
fully adjusted, since changes in domestic asset sup-
plies can alter interest rates so as to drive the ex-
change rate away from its purchasing-power parity
value overa sustained period.
A further assumption, useful in simplifying the
model and peculiarto it, is that the home country is
small-i.e., it cannot affect the foreign country's
rate of interest. Consequently, the foreign rate of
interest can be assumed to be exogenous.
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The formal structure ofthe model is:
RM = m(i,i*)W Central Bank Reserve
Money Equilibrium (8)
B = b(i,i*)W Domestic Government
Bonds Equilibrium (9)
eF = f(i,i*)W Domestically Held
Foreign Bond
Equilibrium (10)
RM+B+eF WWealth Constraint (11)
where RM is central-bank reserve money (mone-
tary base), B is privately-held domestic government
bonds, F is domestically-held foreign assets denom-
inated in foreign currency, e is the exchange rate
expressed in units ofdomestic currency per unit of
foreign currency (e.g., dollar per Deutschemark), i
is the rate ofinterestonB, i* is the rateofintereston
F, and W is total wealth defined by the identity,
equation (11). RM and B are assumed to be non-
traded assets. The desired fraction ofwealth held as
money is m; held as domestic bonds, b; and held as
foreign assets denominated in foreign currency, f.
Although expectations of future exchange-rate
changes are theoretically important in the portfolio-
balance model, they are assumed to be static for
simplicity in this exposition. Moreover, because of
the wealth constraint, equation (11), equations
(8)-(10) are not independent. Given Wand any two
ofRM, B or F, the remaining one can be calculated
from equation (11); equivalently, anyone of equa-
tions (8)-(10) can be eliminated from the system.
For example, with equation (10) eliminated, the
system as written has only two equilibrium equa-
tions, but three variables-i, i* and e. It is, there-
fore, formally undetermined. Here is where the
small-country assumption helps simplify things. If
the home country cannot affect the foreign rate of
interest, then i* = i *, some fixed rate in the extreme
shortrun. Then only equations (8) and (9) are need-
ed to determine the domestic rate ofinterest and the
exchange rate.Let us examine the mechanism through which
this formal model determines the exchange rate. In
the right-hand panel in Figure 2, the ratioofdomes-
tic government bonds to outside money (B/RM) is
plotted against the domestic interest rate (i) for a
constant domestic rate of inflation and a constant
foreign rate ofinterest (i*). The shape ofA depends
on the functions m and b. For simplicity we will
assume it to be linear. In the model with equation
(10) eliminated and i* =1*, dividing equation(9) by
equation (8) yields (B/RM) = b(i,i*)/m(i,i*) =
cP(i). Hence for each value of i there is a value of
(B/RM), and vice versa, which is independentofW
and F: for any value of i*, the ratio of domestic
bonds to outside money alone determines the do-
mestic interest rate.
The left-hand panel plots the domestic currency
value of private holdings of foreign assets (eF)
against the domestic interest rate for constant infla-
tion, foreign interest rate and the stocks ofdomestic
bonds and outside money. The curve (f,) slopes
downward because domestic and foreign bonds are
substitutes in domestic portfolios. An increase in
the domestic interest rate, other things equal, in-
creases the demand for domestic bonds and de-
creases the demand for foreign bonds as shares in
total wealth. An increase in domestic bonds stocks
and outside money shifts the curves (f) up and to the
left. To understand this point, consider an equipro-
portional increase in Band RM: the ratio (B/RM)
remains constant and therefore for a given i* and
f(i,i*), i remains constant; nevertheless, W has in-
creased [see equation (II)]; and, therefore, by equa-
tion (10), eF must be greaterby the amount f· Aw.
Now let us consider the effects of changes
in various asset stocks (Figure 2). Begin with a
bond/money ratio (B/RM)" an interest rate i,
and-reading off curve f;-the value of holdings
of foreign assets (eF)',. Now, holding Band F
constant, allow RM to rise so that the bond/money
ratio moves left to (B/RM)(). The new interestrate is
iO' At the same time the increase in the stock of
money shifts the curve f; outward to f" because
total wealth is now greater. The intersection of f,
Figure 2
Determination of Domestic















(S/RM),with iocorresponds to (eF)~, which is greater than
(eF)'I' According to our initial assumption, F has
not changed, therefore e must be greater: the ex-
change rate depreciates as the stock of outside
money increases. (Recall that F represents the
domestic holdings of foreign assets accumulated
through the current account. In the short run with
wealth fixed, the current account is in balance, and
hence F is a given. Any change in domestic assets
then alters the domestic interest rate and the value of
the fixed stock offoreign assets.)
The effect ofan expansion ofthe domestic bond
stock is trickier to gauge. Begin with the domestic
bond/money ratio at (B/RM)o, on interest rate ioand
value'ofholdings offoreign assets (eF)o on curve fo,
and let the domestic bond stock expand until it
moves to (B/RM) p holding RM and F constant.
The. interest rate increases from io to iI' Wealth
increases, shifting the curve fooutward. It is cru-
cial, however, just how far f shifts. In the case in
which f shifts only to f;, the new value offoreign-
asset holdings (eF)'1 is less than the initial (eF)o'
With F constant, e must fall in order for (eF) to
reach this level: in this case, an increase in the stock
of bonds appreciates the exchange rate. On the
other hand, when f shifts further out to fl , the new
value offoreign-asset holdings (eF)1is greater than
(eF)o, and therefore e must rise: in this case, an
increase in the stock of bonds depreciates the ex-
change rate.
A change in the stock ofdomestic bonds can thus
either appreciate or depreciate the exchange rate,
depending upon the relative size of two effects-
the one shifting the curve f outward, and the other
moving upward along the given f curve. The situ-
ation is familiar in economic analysis: a wealth
effect conflicting with a substitution effect. As
the wealth effect dominates, the exchange rate
depreciates; as the substitution effect dominates,
it appreciates.
Branson has shown that if domestic bonds and
money are better wealth substitutes than domestic
bonds and foreign bonds, the wealth effect will
dominate and the exchange rate will depreciate, and
vice versa. To understand this condition, consider
once again the expansion of the domestic-bond
stock leading to the shiftfrom (B/RM)o to (B/RM)j'
The increase in domestic bonds initially tends to
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increase wealth, which in tum increasesthe demand
for both money and foreign assets at an unchanged
rate ofinterest. The domestic interest rate must rise
in order to increase the demand for domestic bonds
until it equals the new greatersupply-andin order
to decrease thedemand for money until it equals its
unchanged supply.
If domestic bonds and foreign bonds are better
wealth substitutes than domestic bonds and money,
the rise in the interest rate that restores the equality
between money demand and supply will produce a
greaterdrop in the demand for foreign assets than in
the demand for money at the new level of wealth.
The value of the unchange stock of foreign assets
(eF)o would then be greater than demand for them.
Thus with F constant, e must fall-that is, the
exchange rate must appreciate-to bring the value
of the supply of foreign assets into line with de-
mand. A fall in the value offoreign.assets, all else
constant, reduces wealth. The curve f, although
shifting outward in line with the wealth increase in
the domestic bond stock, thus exhibits less ofashift
than that increase by itselfwould warrant.
9
On the other hand, if domestic bonds and money
are better wealth substitutes than domestic bonds
and foreign bonds, the rise in the interest rate from io
to il (which makes money demand equal money
supply) produces a smaller drop in the demand for
foreign assets. That demand at the new level of
wealth exceeds the value of the unchanged stock
(eF)o' and e thus must increase-that is, the ex-
change rate must depreciate-to adjust the supply
offoreign assets to the demand. This increase in the
value of the supply offoreign assets, all else con-
stant, increases wealth. Thus the curve f shifts far-
ther out than the increase in the stock of bonds by
itselfwould warrant.
Theeffectofan increase in F, the stockofforeign
assets denominated in foreign currency, is straight-
forward. An increase in F does not change the
bond/money ratio, so the interest rate remains
unchanged. At afixed exchange rate, the increase in
F would increase (eF), the stock of foreign assets
denominated in domestic currency. This in tum
would increase wealth, and thereby increase the
demand for bonds and money beyond the fixed
stocks ofeach. Hence, wealth must not increase if
the supply and demand of money and domesticbonds are to be equal. Therefore, (eF) must fall to
its former level. Since F is fixed at its new level,
only e can fall. It will fall in the exact proportion
that F increased: an increase in the stock offoreign
assets denominated in foreign currency, appreciates
the exchange rate by the same proportion (i.e., the
elasticity ofe with respect to F is -1).
We have seen the effectsofchanges in eachofthe
foreign asset stocks on the exchange rate, other
things held constant. The system ofequations (8) -
(11) can be solved to yield the reduced form:
(12)
Theexchange rate depends on the three asset stocks
and the exogenous foreign interest rate. Following
Branson and his colleagues, we estimate a linear
equation in which i* is replaced by the asset stocks
of the foreign country (indicated by stars), which
are thedeterminantsofi*. The substitution ofRM*,
F* and B* for i* now eliminates the "small coun-
try assumption" for the U.S.; that is, we cannot
assume that other countries' interest rates are in-
sensitive to the monetary-fiscal policy mix of the
foreign country.
(+) (:t) (-)
et = c + a,RMt + alBt + a 3Ft
(-) (+) (+)
+ {3,RMi + {32Bi + (33 Fi + ut (13)
where c is a constant and the ut are random errors.
1O
The (+) or signs over the coefficients indicate
the expected direction ofchange of the exchange
rate resulting from an increase in the corresponding
asset stock, based on the analysis above.
Ourestimation results are reasonably supportive
ofthe portfolio-balance approach, especially when
contrasted with the estimations of other investiga-
tors (see Table 4 and Chart 1). Five of eight co-
efficients on the domestic-bond stock variables are
Table 4
Portfolio-Balance Model for Currenciesof
Canada, Germany, ItalyandJapan Againstthe U.S. Dollar
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.OOOO3c .0072** .00076c ..01OSc .00274ww .25600·5)c .960 2.16 .76 .0109
(.06) 0.02) (.86) (.61) (4.01) <.73)
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.0024 ..99I(10-5)* .45300.7)* .465(1O.5)c .94500·7)w .15200-4)c .14100-6)* .963 2.04 .65 .0001
(3.3) (2.33) (2.03) (.61) 0.34) (1.45) (2.05)
t·statistics in parentheses under the coefficients.
All estimates use the FAIR technique with RMf assumed endogenous.
f- superscript indicates foreign'country variables; US superscript indicates United States' variables.
* Sil,'T1ificantly different from zero at the 95·percent confidence level and ofthe predicted sign.
** Significantly different from zero at the 99-percent confidence level and ofthe predicted sign.
c Insignificant, but ofthe predicted sign.
w Insignificant, and not ofthe predicted sign.
W Significantly different from zero at the 95·percentconfidence level, but not ofthe predicted sign.
WW Significantly different from zero at the 99·percentconfidence level, but not ofthe predicted sign.
See data appendix for a description ofthe data.
30significant, which suggests that the simple mone-
tary model errs in omitting consideration of non-
monetary assets. We have shown above that the
coefficients on domestic-bond stocks could take
either sign in theory. Interestingly, there is great
consistency in the sign pattern: negative coeffi-
cients on the United States' bond stock, BUS, and
positive coefficients on the foreign-bond stock, Br.
In other words, an increase in the domestic-bond
stock appreciates the exchange rate from a coun-
try's own viewpoint, which is consistent with
domestic bonds and foreign bonds being better
substitutes than domestic bonds and money.
Only for the U.S. dollar/German DMequation is
the coefficient on the United States' reserve-money
stock significant and ofthe correct sign. In the other
equations it is insignificant and, in the case of the
U.S. dollar/Italian lira rate, of the wrong sign
as well. The foreign reserve-money stock shows
mixed results. It is insignificant in two cases-of
Chart 2
U.S. Effective Exchange Rate and Purchasing Power Parity
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31the correct sign with respect to Canada and of the
wrong sign with respect to Japan. It is significant
and ofthe correct sign in the case ofthe Italian lira,
but significantandofthe incorrect sign in thecaseof
the German DM.
The coefficient on the United States' foreign-
asset stock is significant andofthe wrong sign inthe
case of Canada-but of the correct sign, though
insignificant, for the otherrates. The coefficientson
the foreign countries' foreign-asset stock are again
mixed: ofthe correct sign but insignificant for Can-
ada and Germany; of the wrong sign though still
insignificant for Italy; and of the correct sign and
significant for Japan.
In all, the equations for the U.S. dollar/Japanese
yen and the U.S. dollar/Italian lira best support the
portfolio-balance approach-in bothequations, the
only coefficients with incorrect signs are statistical-
ly insignificant-yet these equations tell different
stories. The liraequation provided the most support
for the monetary approach. In the portfolio-balance
model, the U.S. bond stock and Italian reserve
money are significant in explaining the exchange
rate. The significance ofthese two factors-because
bonds are a direct influence on the interest-rate
differential and reserve money on the inside-money
differential-is broadly consistent with the relative
success ofthe Italian monetary equation.
The Japanese yen equation provided the least
support for the monetary approach. With the port-
folio-balance model, both domestic bond stocks
and the Japanese foreign-bond stock are significant,
while both reserve-money stocks are not. This
suggests that non-monetary, financial variables are
crucial in determining this rate. To the extent that
the monetary model assumes these variables away,
then one would expect it to fail.
The Canadian and German equations are flawed
in having significant coefficients with the wrong
sign. The German reserve-money stock carries a
positive, rather than the expected negative sign.
U.S. foreign-asset stock in the Canadian equation
carries the incorrect, positive sign. Canada is a
difficult country to model, however, because ofthe
close integration ofthe U.S. and Canadian financial
markets. A significant amount of Canadian debt is
denominated in U.S. dollars, which muddies the
distinction between domestic and foreign assets for
both countries and probablyconfuses the estimation
ofsuch simple models as those presented here.
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When we compare the IPs reported for each
equation in Tables 3 and 4, we clearly see that port-
folio-balance models generally track actualexchange
rates better than the simple monetary model. (For
Italy they do about the same.) Acasual inspectionof
the charts strikingly reveals the same point. (For
convenience, Chart I presents fitted and actual val-
ues of the exchange rate expressed as units offor-
eign currency per dollar, rather than as estimated.)
In the period since floating began in March 1973,
the five countries in our study followed very differ-
ent domestic economic policies and exhibited very
different exchange-rate patterns. Over the period
covered by our estimations, the rate against the
U.S. dollar appreciated sharply for Germany and
Japan and depreciated sharply for Canada and Italy.
Our estimations suggest that asset-market models
help explain these movements. So it is fair to say
that they are explained-atleast inpart-bydiffer-
ent mixtures ofeconomic policies adopted by th<;:se
various countries.
To be sure, the monetary model-even in the
best case, Italy-is not well supported. But the
portfolio-balance model generally is moderately
well supported, and does strikingly well in the cases
IV. Conclusions and Policy Implications
ofItaly and Japan. The portfolio-balance model is a
more general model, since it includes more assets
and does not restrict the degree of substitutability
between them. Other technical differences notwith-
standing, the monetary model can be thoughtofas a
portfolio-balance model in which domestic and for-
eign bonds are perfect substitutes.
The argument can be made that the monetary
approach was not given a fair test. All exchange
rates estimated were vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar and,
as is now well known, a "shift" in U.S. money
demand appears to have taken place around 1974-
75. Thus the assumption of stable money-demand
functions may not have held over the estimation
period. Nevertheless, when cross-exchange rates
not involving the dollar were estimated-e.g., the
32DM/yen exchange rate-the monetary approach
still did not perform any better.
Ourresults should be interpreted cautiously. The
estimations cover a limited period, and the quali-
ty of the data is often poor~especially for the
foreign-bond stocks in the portfolio-balance mod-
els. Still, our estimations are favorable enough to
encourage further research emphasizing the effects
of financial-policy mixtures on the behavior of
exchange rates.
The policy implications must also be viewed
cautiously. The portfolio models estimated here are
short-TUn models whose long-run implications have
not been empirically described. Nonetheless, the
estimated portfolio models suggest that the dollar
exchange rate against the German mark, Italian lira
and Japanese yen will appreciate in the short run
should the U.S. run a sizable government deficit
which is financed in the private market. Our evi-
dence suggests that, in the short run at least, a
combination of large Federal deficits and slow
monetary-base growth will result in a major appre-
ciationofthe U.S. dollar.
As Charles Pigott has shown in the Fall 1982
issue of this Review, substantial and prolonged
deviations from purchasing-power parity occurred
in recent years between the U.S. and other major
industrial countries.
12 (See Chart 2.) Pigott attrib-
utes the deviations to shifts in relative prices. Such
deviations could also be due to the behavior ofreal
interest rates, caused by changes in the monetary-
fiscal policy mix among major countries. A large
increase in U.S. government debt in 1982, com-
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binedwith low monetary growth, would thus con-
tinue to keep the effective (trade-weighted) U.S.
dollar-exchange rate away from its purchasing-
powervalue, as has occurred since late 1980.
Ifthe dollar remains strong, U.S. goods exports
could remain weak for some time, primarily be-
cause 98 percent of U.S. exports are denominated
in dollars. However, a strong dollardoes not neces-
sarily implythat other countries' net.exports will
improve at ourexpense. Such adevelopment would
depend on the currency composition of various
countries' exports. In 1980, for example, Japan
denominated 61 percent of its exports in dollars,
and 93 percent of its imports.
13 For Germany the
U.S.-dollar denominations were 7 percent for ex-
ports and 33 percent for imports. Hence, in the
short run, a strong dollar could hurt the net export
earnings ofsome ofour trading partners as well as
the U.S.
The strength ofthe dollar also affects othercoun-
tries by the valuation effects on their financial
wealth denominated in dollars. Many European
countries and middle-Eastern oil exporters have a
large portion of their net financial wealth denomi-
nated in dollars. A continued strong dollar in 1982
could provide positive wealth effects to countries
which otherwise would be weakened by that factor.
The exchange value of the dollar thus affects a
country's net wealth position as well as its demands
for exports and imports. Testing alternative theories
ofexchange rates helps to improve our understand-
ing of how macroeconomic policy affects trade
flows and the value ofnational wealth.Data Appendix
Data for both the monetary and the portfolio
models cover five countries-Canada, Germany,
Italy, Japan and the United States. Except where
noted in other sections, all data come from the
following sources:
- Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve sys-
tem, Statistical Release H.6 (FRB), various
issues.
- International Monetary Fund, International Fi-
nancial Statistics (IFS), February 1980.
- Morgan Guaranty Bank, World Financial Mar-
ket (WFM), various issues.
Unless otherwise noted all series run from 1972
to September 1979, even though the estimation per-
iod is generally March 1973 to December 1978.
Seasonally adjusted (SA) data are used. Unless
noted differently, all seasonally adjusted data are
adjusted overthe periodJanuary 1972 to September
1979 (or, for IFS data, to latest available date), with
the use of the XII (multiplicative) method. For
series that are sums or differences of component
series, the components are seasonally adjusted be-
fore computations are made.
All stock data are expressed in billions of the
national currencies ofeach country, except for the
foreign asset stock (F) for Canada and Germany,
which are expressed in millions.
Variable Names and Definitions
B = net private claims on government (private
ownership of government debt) = IFS line
32an (Monetary Survey: Claims on Govern-
ment (net) (SA)-IFS line l2a (Central Bank:
Claims on Government) (SA)
e - end-of-period exchange rate (U.S. dollars
per foreign unit) = l/(IFS line ae (Market
Rate/ParorCentral Rate»
F net private financial claims on foreigners
«total foreign assets held less official re-
serves and government holdings of foreign
debt less direct investment in foreign coun-
tries) less total liabilities to foreigners less
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official holdings by foreigners ofhomecoun-
try's debt-direct investment in home coun-
try». Generally, we accumulated surpluses
(deficits) on current account less changes in
reserves over annual benchmarks for net
foreign-asset positions. We then interpolated
this quarterly series to monthly. Sources for
benchmark data were:
- Bank ofCanada Review, February 1980,
Table AIS.
- Monthly Report ofthe Deutsche Bundes-
bank, October 1979, pp. 27-34.
- Bank ofJapan, private communication.
Bank of Italy, Annual Report, 1976,
Tables GIS, G 20, G 21.
- Department of Commerce, "Internation-
al Investment Position of the United
States," Table 3, Survey ofCurrent Bus-
iness, September 1977 and August 1979.
Forfurther details, see data appendix ofJ. Bisigna-
no and K. D. Hoover, "Alternative Asset Market
Approaches to Exchange Rate Determination,"
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working
Papers in Applied Economic Theory and Econo-
metrics, No. 105, August 1980.
I = short-term interest rate = WFM represen-
tative money-market rate.
m widely defined money stock = IFS line 34
(Money) (SA) + IFS line 35 (quasi-
money) (SA). This obtained for all coun-
tries except the U.S., for which m = FRB
M-2 (old definition) (SA).
RM central-bank money (monetary base) =
IFS line 14 (Reserve Money) (SA).
y real income proxied by the index ofindus-
trial production = IFS line 66..C (Indus-
trial Production) (SA).
cr = ratio ofnet private financial claims on gov-
ernment to central-bank money = B/RM.FOOTNOTES
1. See for example H. G. Johnson, The Casefor Flexible
Exchange Rates, Institute for Economic Affairs, London
1969, or Egon Sohmen, Flexible Exchange Rates, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1969. The advocates of floating
of course carried the day; nevertheless, the battle was
pitched: see for instance Paul Einzig, The Case Against
Floating Exchanges, Macmillan, St. Martin's Press, 1970,
and a retrospective survey of the debate in H. Fournier
and J. E. Wadsworth (eds.) Floating Exchange Rates-
Lessons of Recent Experience, Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff,
1976. With the turbulent experience of the 1970's behind
us, the lines of battle are joined once more: see Gottfried
Haberler, "Flexible-Exchange Rate Theories and Contro-
versies Once Again," American Enterprise Institute Reprint
No. 119, January 1981.
2. "RecentTrends in the Flow of Funds in Japan-Center-
ing on the Expansion of Public Sector Deficit," The Bank of
Japan,Economic Research Department, Special Paper
No. 79, p. 1, December 1978. Examination ofthe individual
country summaries in the various issues of the O.E.C.D.
EconomicOutlookalso confirm thatpublicdebtexpanded
in major industrial countries following the 1973 oil crisis,
especially in Japan.
3. Two useful reviews of general asset-market and specific
monetary-models approaches may be seen in Michael
Mussa, "Empirical Regularities in the Behavior of Ex-
change Rates and Theories of the Foreign Exchange Mar-
ket," in Policies for Employment, Prices, and Exchange
Rates, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1979, and
John F. O. Bilson, "Recent Developments in Monetary
Models of Exchange Rate Determination," International
Monetary Fund, Staff Papers (January 1979). A represen-
tative selection of estimated monetary/exchange-rate
models is contained in Jacob A. Frenkel and Harry G.
Johnson, eds., The Economics of Exchange Rates:
Selected Studies, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company
(1978). An important extension of the monetary approach
stressing real interest rates is found in Jeffrey Frankel, "On
the Mark: A Theory of Floating Exchange Rates Based on
Real Interest Differentials," American Economic Review,
September 1979.
4. Abstracting of course from transportation costs and
barriers to trade.
5. In practice, this is possible only if the demand curve is
more stable than the supply curve-that is, if the supply
curve is subject to more shocks or random error than the
demand curve-or if econometric identification can be
secured in some other way.
6. See Bilson (note 3 above) foran illustration of the use of
rational expectations in the monetary approach, where the
forward rate is equated to the mathematical expectedvalue
of the future spot rate. The now-common procedure show-
ing thatthe current spot rate is a function oftheentire future
history of expectations of the exogenous variables origi-
nates with Thomas J. Sargent and Neil Wallace, "Rational
Expectations and the Dynamics of Hyperinflation," Inter-
national Economic Review (June 1973).
7. Initial estimates of equation (5) for several countries
showed the presence of substantial first-order serial corre-
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lation. Consequently, we now estimate it using the FAIR
technique, an estimation method which guarantees consis-
tent estimates when using Cochrane-Orcuttcorrections for
first-order serial correlation with instrumental variables.
See Ray C. Fair, "The Estimation of Simultaneous Equa-
tion Modelswith Lagged Endogenous Variables and First
Order Serially Correlated Errors," Econometrica (May
1970).
8. "Exchange Rates in the Short Run: The Dollar
Deutschemark Rate," European Economic Review, 10,
(1977) pp. 303-324. For other expositions, see W. H. Bran-
son and H. Halttunen, "Asset-Market Determination of
Exchange Rates: Initial Empiricaland Policy Results," in J.
P. Martin and A. Smith (eds.), Trade and Payments Ad-
justment under Flexible Exchange Rates. London: Mac-
millan, 1979; W. H. Branson, ''Asset Markets and Relative
Prices in Exchange Rate Determination," Sozialwissen-
schaftliche Annalen, Band 1, 1977, pp. 69-89; and Joseph
Bisignano and Kevin Hoover, "Alternative Asset Market
Approaches to Exchange Rate Determination," Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Papers in Ap-
plied Economic Theory and Econometrics, No. 105,
August 1980.
9. H. Genberg and H. Kierkowski, in "Impact and Long-
Run Effects of Economic Disturbances in a Dynamic Model
of Exchange Rate Determination," Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv (1979), provide a very similar analysis with a dia-
gram quite like Figure 3.
10. See Bisignano and Hoover (''Alternative Asset Market
Approaches .. :'). Branson, etal., in fact, dropthe domestic
bond stocks, Band B*, for the econometrically spurious
reason that the sign of their coefficients cannot be deter-
mined apriori(Branson, etal., 1977, p. 311). Whetherornot
the sign of the coefficient is known in advance, an omitted
variable biases the regression. The portfolio-balance mod-
el presented here is a model of private behavior. Of course,
it is well known that governments intervene in foreign-
exchangemarketstosupporttheirown oranothercountry's
currency. We donotplan to modelthis process here. Never-
theless, we must mark its effect: buying and selling foreign
exchange produces changesin the monetarybase; ifthese
transactions are. related to the exchange rate (e.g., the
domestic government sells foreign exchange when the
exchange rate depreciates, decreasing its monetary base,
and buys when the rate appreciates, increasing its mone-
tary base), then errors in determining e, the ut in equation
(13), will be correlated with RM. Such a correlation violates
the conditions necessary for ordinary least-squares esti-
mates to be unbiased and consistent. Consistency can be
obtained by using an instrumental variable technique. Pre-
liminary estimations showed that the ut in equation (13)
have substantial first-order serial correlation. Consequent-
ly, we have estimated equation (13) using the FAIR tech-
nique, an instrumental variable estimator with Cochrane-
Orcuttcorrectionsfor.first-orderserial correlation described
earlier.
11. In a forthcoming paper, "Some Suggested Improve-
ments to a Simple Portfolio Balance Model of Exchange
Rate Determination with Special Reference to the U.S.
Dollar/Canadian Dollar Rate," Weltwirtschaftliches Ar-chiv, (Heft 1, 1982), we attempt to improve the portfolio-
balance model for Canada by: 1) using bilateral dataforthe
holdings of foreign asset stocks; 2) explicitly dealingwith
the problems of currency of denomination; and 3) setting
out a more general portfolio-balance model which does not
make the small-country assumption. In addition, we use
tests of Granger/causality to test the appropriateness of
the small-country assumption for the case of Canada.
12. See Charles Pigott, "The Influence ofReal Factors on
Exchange Rates," Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
Economic Review (Fall 1981).
13. SeeSAB. Page, "The Choice ofInvoicingCurrency in
Merchandise Trade," National Institute Economic Re-
view (November 1981). Page notes that invoicing some
portion ofexports and imports in both domesticandforeign
currencies tends to smooth the adjustment to exchange-
rate changes, and results in less severe J-curves than
would result when all export transactions are denominated
in the exporters' home currency.
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